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Defendant-AppeJ.1ant;~·~~, 
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Ii~ THE SUPREMJ:: COURT 
. OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
wr::STERN READY ~nx CONCRETE 
CO~PANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff-~espondent. 
vs. 
RICH~Rn ~ODRIGUJ::Z and 
JEANE C. LeCHEMINANT, 
Defendants, 
EDGAR KELLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
:lRIEF OF APPELLA~:fT 
Case No. 14811 
STA'rFnENT OF HATTJ'q,E OF CASE 
This is an action by respondent, Western Ready Mix Con-
crete Comoanv, for th·2 failure of appellant to post a bond as re-
quired by Section 14-2-1 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and 
for the foreclosure of a notice of lien placed on appellant's 
property by the responuent for materials used in the improvement 
of appellant's real property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., who found in 
favor of the respondent and awarded judgment in the sum of 
~553.21, together with attorney fees of S300.00, costs of court 
of ~33.10, and a decree foreclosing respondent's lien on appel-
lant's real property. (R. 35-37) 
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Appellant filed an o~jection to the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law on the grounds that they were not in 
accordance with the facts and eviden~e adduced at trial and were 
unclear and ambiguous. Appellant further moved the court for a 
new trial on the grounds that the evidence did not justify the 
verdict and there was an error in law (R. 42-44) which the court 
denied. (R. 47-48) 
RELIEF SOUGHT 0'.'J APPEAL 
The appellant seeks ~ reversal of the judgment entered 
by the trial court, costs of court and attorney fees. 
STATEMENT OF FZ'\CTS 
Appellant, on or about the 17th day of December, 1974, 
entered into a contract with Richard J. Rodriguez (referred to 
the contractor) to improve appellant's real property, located at 
941 South 4th East, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 82, P.E. 1) Appel-
lant paid Rodriguez in full for the improvements with three c~ecks, 
T 
dated December 24, 1974, for $1,000.00; January 9, 1975, for $1,150.00 
and February 19, 1975, for $1,258.38. (R. 109, D.E. 4) Rodriguez 
ordered t~e cement that was used on appellant's property from the 
respondent and received it on six different occasions, being January 
9, 1975; January 10, 1975; February ~. 1975; February 10, 1975; 
February 10, 1975 and February 12, 1975. (R. 86, P.E. 2) Respond-
ent claims that Rodrirruez failed to pay for the cement he received. 
Rodriguez' testimony is th<it on or about the 9th or lflth of January, 
1975, he paid to the respondent $600.00 in cas~ and stated this was 
to pay for the cenent in the Kelley job. (R. 112-113) Respor.dents 
testified they did receive ~500. 00 from Ronriguez and they receipted 
't · th· ...._ k th , "'d f F b 1975, but that nothing 1 in eir uoo son __ e ,n,, ay o e r~ary, 
was stated as to what account it was to n.pply to. (P. 107) 
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Respondent further stated thev did have a number of accounts 
with Rodriguez (R. 96) and according to company policy, they 
applied the $600.00 to the oldest account without demanding of 
Rodriguez a designation of what account the money should be 
applied to. (R. 108) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE LAW THAT APPLIES IN THIS CASE. 
At the close of respondent's case, appellant made a 
motion to dismiss based upon Section 58-23-14.5 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. (R. 38) The motion was taken under advisement 
by the court and after the appellant presented his evidence, the 
motion was denied. 
Section 58-23-14.5 UCA, 1953 provides: 
Any owner or contractor in making any 
payment ~o a materialman, contractor, or subcon-
tractor with whom he has a running account, or 
with whom he has more than one contract, or to 
whom he is otherwise indebted, shall designate 
the contract under which the payment is made or 
the items of account to which it is to be applied. 
When a payment for materials or labor is 
made to a subcontractor, or materialman, such sub-
contractor or materialman shall demand of the per-
son making such payment a designation of the account 
and the items of account to which such payment is to 
apply. In any case where a lien is claimed for 
materials furnished or labor performed by a subcon-
tractor or materialman, it shall be a defense to 
such claim that a payment made, by the owner to the 
contractor for such materials has been so designated, 
and paid over to such subcontractor or materialman, 
and that when such payment was received by such sub-
contractor or materialman he did not demand a desig-
nation of the account and of the items of account to 
which such payment was to be applied. 
The case before the court falls squarely within this 
statute. It appears that the legislature intended to eliminate 
situations where a property owner pays a contractor for improving 
-3-
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his real property anJ the ~ontractor pays the materialman with 
whom he has a number of accounts but fails to designate what 
account the payment shall be applied to, and the materialman goes 
ahead on his own and merely applies it to the oldest account, or 
the account that would suit the materialrnan the best. The legis-
lature saw fit to place the responsibility directly on the shoulders 
of the materialmen to demand of the contractor exactly what account 
the payment should be applied to. 
I refer the court to the testimony given by :'1r. Murl c. 
Woodbury, who is the Credit Manager with respondent company. 
(R. 88, 107, 108) 
Q Mr. Woodbury, I believe you stated you have other accounts 
with Mr. Rodriguez, is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q O.I<. In other words, this January, February, March of 1975, 
what amounts do you show that !Ir. Rodriguez paid on any account 
which you have with him? 
A May I look it up, Sir? 
Q S'.lre. 
A The last cash receipt I show here, Sir, is on the 2nd day of 
February, 1975. 
Q And what does that show? 
A $600.00. 
Q And what account has that been credited to? 
A To the eldest invoices. 
Q Do you have a personal knowledge of why it was charqed to the 
oldest account? 
A Yes. 
Q Will you so state? 
-4-
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~ Yes. Ur.less the invoice so states the a~ount automati-
cally is thereby applied to the oldest invoices. 
Q Is that your policy? 
!\ Yes, sir. 
Q And did you make any personal investigation or contact Mr. 
Rodriguez and ask him as to what account that should be applied 
to? 
A Usually :1.r. Rodriguez brought in the amounts. 
Q No. I asked you did you make any contact with Mr. Rodri-
guez and ask him what account this should be applied to? 
A No, sir. 
I also call the court's attention to the testimony of Mr. 
Rodriguez in a conversation he had with Mr. Van_Roosendaal, the 
President of the responcent company, who refused to deliver the 
cement 1.mtil he was paid. 11r. Rodriguez stated that he paid 
him $COO.OO and told him it was to apply on the Kelley job. 
(~. 112-113) 
"'!r. Woodbury states that this payment was receipted into 
their record on February 2, 1975, and Mr. Rodriquez states that 
to the best of his recollection the money was paid on January 9 
or 10, 1975. (R. 12) 
The court in its Memorandum Decision seemed to put some 
weigb.t on ti1is conflict in testimony wherein it stated: 
33) 
. the testi-nony of r{odriguez offered by the 
defendants in connection with their defense does 
not jibe with the exhibits introduced and received 
by the court, particularly those of the plaintiff, 
which records were kept in the usual course of 
1 • 
,)usiness. 
(R. 32-
The court refused to explain just exactly what records 
t!·''"Y were referring to w:<en the :i.ppellant objected to the 
-5-
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Conclusions of Law and asked that they be clarified. (R. 47-48) 
It appears that the court is referring to the cement delivery 
orders for some are dated after the respondent received the $600.0Q, 
It is interesting to note that Mr. Woodbury testified that Rodriguez 
was a bad account and that he had been on C.O.D. Yet he did not ex-
plain why the cement deliveries of January 9 and 10 were not marked 
either C.O.D. or charge. (R. 99, 101) This seems to indicate that 
the amount had been paid and Mr. Rodriguez had a credit with the 
company, but later the $600.00 was applied to the oldest account and 
Mr. Rodriguez was then put on charge. Mr. Woodbury's only explana-
tion when asked why they were not C.O.D. stated that this was a 
management decision. (R. 102, P.E. 2) 
Appellant submits that this is exactly the type of situa-
tion that the legislature could foresee happening and the only thing 
that is material is that the contractor paid $600. 00 to the material-
man which he admits receiving and further admits that he failed to 
demand of the contractor a designation of the account to which the 
payment should have been applied. 
All other matters as to conflicting testimony of dates 
and exhibits are immaterial in view of the statute. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES. 
The respondent brought this action under Title 38, 
Chapter I of the Utah Code Annotated to foreclose a mechanics lien 
and claims it is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to section 
38-1-18, UCA, 1953, which provides: 
In any action brought to enforce any 
lien under this chapter the successful party 
shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attor-
ney's fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall 
-6-
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l 
be taxec as costs in the action. 
The court will note that this section provides that 
the successful party shall be entitled to recover reasonable 
attorney fees. I refer the court to the case of Palombi vs. 
D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325. In that case a 
lien had been filed and the opposing party who was successful 
in defense of the foreclosure action was claiming an attorney 
fee and the court stated: 
It will be noted the statute confers 
the benefit not only on the one who asserts the 
lien but upon the "successful party"; in this 
instance the plaintiff, who defended against the 
lien. 
In view of the fact t:-,at respondent was awarded attorney fees by 
the trial court, the appellant, if successful in defense of the 
action, should also be awarded attorney fees. 
CO~JCLUSION 
In view of the record of this case and the statute 
and authority cit9d herein, it should be determined by the court 
that the contractor paid the respondent the amount to cover the 
Kelley job and the respondent failed to demand a designation of 
which account the payment should have been applied which is in 
violation of the protection given the property owner by the leg-
islature. 
The court also in reversing the decision of the trial 
co•.Jrt should award attorney fees to the appellant, being the 
successful party on the appeal. 
-7-
Respectfully submitted, 
Homer F. Wilkinson 
Attorney for defendant-
appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF Df:LIVERY 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered two copies 
of the foregoinq to E. IL Fankhauser, Attorney for Plaintiff-Res-
pondent, at 430 Judge Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 
day of February, 1977. 
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